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Abstract
In this paper we study quality measures of different solution concepts for the multicast
network design game on a ring topology. We recall from the literature a lower bound of 43
and prove a matching upper bound for the price of stability, which is the ratio of the social
costs of a best Nash equilibrium and of a general optimum. Therefore, we answer an open
question posed by Fanelli et al. in [12]. We prove an upper bound of 2 for the ratio of the
costs of a potential optimizer and of an optimum, provide a construction of a lower bound,
and give a computer-assisted argument that it reaches 2 for any precision. We then turn
our attention to players arriving one by one and playing myopically their best response. We
provide matching lower and upper bounds of 2 for the myopic sequential price of anarchy
(achieved for a worst-case order of the arrival of the players). We then initiate the study of
myopic sequential price of stability and for the multicast game on the ring we construct a
lower bound of 43 , and provide an upper bound of
26
19 . To the end, we conjecture and argue
that the right answer is 43 .
Keywords: Network design game; Nash equilibrium; Price of stability/anarchy; Ring
topology; Myopic sequential price of stability/anarchy; Potential-optimum price of stabil-
ity/anarchy
1 Introduction
Network design game is played by n players on an edge-weighted graph. Each player i, i =
0, . . . , n−1, connects her terminal vertices si and ti by selecting an si-ti path Pi. Using an edge
e costs ce and all players using it share the cost equally. In total, player i’s cost for using path
Pi is the sum of all shares towards the edges of Pi.
Network design game belongs to the broader class of congestion games. It is a special
congestion game in that increasing the congestion on a resource makes it cheaper to use (in
contrast to the more established and studied games with monotone increasing cost functions).
Finite congestion games are exact potential games, i.e., games for which a potential function
exists, i.e., a function Φ(P0, . . . , Pn−1) → R that exactly reflects the difference in any player’s
cost, if this unilaterally changes her path from Pi to P
′
i . It is well-known that exact potential
games always possess a pure Nash equilibrium, for example the vector (P0, . . . , Pn−1) minimizing
the potential function Φ. The price of anarchy is the ratio of the worst Nash equilibrium cost
and the general optimum cost, and can be as large as n. The price of stability, which is the ratio
of the best Nash equilibrium cost and the general optimum cost, of network design games is
well understood for directed graphs – it is at most Hn [3], where Hn = 1 + 1/2 + 1/3 + · · ·+ 1/n
is the n-th harmonic number (equal asymptotically to log n) and the matching lower bound
example has also been constructed. The price of stability of the game is much less understood
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for undirected graphs. While it is known to be strictly smaller than Hn [11, 19], namely, at most
Hn/2 [19], the largest known example has price of stability equal to roughly 2.245 [6]. Closing
this gap is a major open problem in the field of congestion games and in the computational
game theory in general.
For the special type of the game where all players have the same target vertex t, better
bound on the price of stability has been proven [15]. If additionally each vertex of a graph is a
source vertex of some player, a series of papers improved the upper bound [13, 17, 8], where
the latest result of Bilo` et al. [8] shows that price of stability is O(1) in this class of games. In
many results, the potential function, and the equilibria minimizing it, play an important role.
Actually, equilibria minimizing potential function are regarded as stable (against noise) by
Asadpour and Saberi [4], and accordingly, some authors studied the price of stability restricted
to these kind of equilibria [16, 19], the so-called potential-optimum price of stability.
One of the motivations to study best Nash equilibria is that they can be regarded as out-
comes of the game if a little coordination is present – an authority that suggests the players
the strategies Pi. Then, players have no incentive to unilaterally deviate from the suggested
strategy profile. It is questionable whether such an authority exists – it would need to be very
strong, both computationally and imperatively. To address this applicability issue of equilib-
rium concepts, sequential versions of the game were studied: the players arrive one by one, and
upon arrival, player i chooses myopically the best path Pi as if this was the end of the game
(i.e., no further players would arrive). Chekuri et al. [10] show that the total cost achieved by a
worst-case permutation of the arriving players is at most O(
√
n log n) times the optimum cost.
Subsequently, Charikar et al. [9] improved this bound to O(log2 n) (the original version [9] is er-
roneous, but the authors provide corrected arguments upon request). The worst-case approach
to the order in which the players arrive naturally models the complete lack of coordination. In
this paper, we suggest to study also the best-case order in which players arrive. This is moti-
vated by the presence of an authority that can control the access to the resources over time (and
thus decide an order of the arriving players). Such an authority is arguably weaker than the
one mentioned above, as it does not impose any decision upon the players, and it leaves them
to decide their strategies freely upon arriving. Bilo´ et al. [7] studied a version of a cost sharing
scheme for multicast network design game, in which each player only knows strategies of some
other players, and pays fair share of edge costs that she uses based only on her information.
Sequential versions described above can be modeled with this cost sharing scheme.
In this paper, we focus on one specific network topology: the ring. This is a fundamental
topology in networking and communications. It is the edge-minimal topology that is resistant
against a single link fault. From the decentralized point of view, call control comes close in
spirit to network design games, in that the connecting si-ti paths needs to be chosen to obey
given capacities on the links [1]. The study of approximation algorithms is the counterpart
to bounding the prices of anarchy and stability. Rings have also been intensively studied in
the distributed setting, e.g., among plenty of others, in the context of the fundamental leader
election problem [5].
Network design games on rings has previously been studied by Fanelli et al. [12], which show
a tight bound of 3/2 on the price of stability for the general setting. In this paper we restrict
ourselves to the multicast version in which all players share the same target vertex t = ti,
i = 0, . . . , n − 1 and answer the open question asked by Fanelli et al. [12] about tight bounds
of the price of stability for multicast game on a ring. We study various solutions concepts
and analyze their quality compared to an optimum network (with respect to the social cost).
In most cases, we are able to provide tight bounds. Furthermore, we also study the myopic
sequential price of stability in general multicast network design games, and give a simpler proof
of an upper bound of 4 for this class of games compared to a more general proof in [7] (cf. this
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Figure 1: Multicast game on rings.
with the upper bound of log2 n on the myopic sequential price of anarchy for multicast games).
2 Preliminaries
Network design game is a strategic game of n players played on an edge-weighted graph G =
(V,E) with non-negative edge costs ce, e ∈ E. Each player i, i = 0, . . . , n− 1, has a dedicated
source node si and a target node ti. In the multicast game all ti’s are the same and we denote
it by t throughout a paper. All si-ti paths form the set Pi of the strategies of player i. Each
player i chooses one path pi ∈ Pi, the union of which creates a network in which all si-ti pairs
are connected. The cost for player i is
∑
e∈pi
c(e)
n(e)
where n(e) is the number of players that use
the edge e in their chosen paths. A strategy profile p is a vector of strategies for all players,
p = (p0, . . . , pn−1). A strategy profile is Nash equilibrium if no player can unilaterally change
her strategy pi to p
′
i and improve her cost. The (social) cost of a strategy profile p is the cost
of the created network, i.e., the sum of the costs of all edges in the created network, which is,
in turn, the sum of all players’ costs. An optimum network is a network of minimum social
cost in which all si-ti pairs are connected. An optimum network can be equivalently described
by a strategy profile p∗, and then we refer to p∗ as an optimum strategy profile. Note that an
optimum strategy profile is not, in general, a Nash equilibrium. Observe also that in a multicast
game an optimum network forms a Steiner tree on the terminals si and t for i = 0, . . . , n − 1.
If an underlying graph G is a ring, then there are only 2 possible strategies for each player.
In this paper, we focus on the multicast game on rings. We can assume, without loss of
generality, that every node but the target t is a source of exactly one player. Otherwise, we
can modify the topology by the following two operations. If there are l > 1 players sharing the
same node x of the ring as a source vertex, we make l copies of this vertex, add l−1 consecutive
edges of cost 0 between them to make a path of length l − 1, replace x in the ring with this
path in a natural way, and associate each vertex with a unique source (copy of x). If there is a
node x in the ring which is not a target nor a source of any player, we delete x from the ring,
and connect its two neighbors by an edge of cost ce + ce′ , where e, e
′ are the two adjacent edges
of x. A repetitive application of these two operations preserve the cost of optimum and Nash
equilibrium strategy profiles, and also preserves the equilibrium properties of strategy profiles
(if the strategies are expressed in the form “go clockwise/counterclockwise to si”).
We label the sources (players) and the edges connecting them in a counter-clockwise order
as in Fig. 1, where ai denotes the cost of the i-th edge. Player i has exactly 2 strategies, one is
to go left, i.e., clockwise, taking edges i, i− 1, . . . 0, or to go right, i.e., counterclockwise, taking
edges i + 1, . . . n. Observe that the optimum strategy profile is the one which uses all edges
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Figure 3: Example of a lower bound 4/3.
except the most expensive edge. Let o denote the most expensive edge. Then the (social) cost
of an optimum network is
∑
i 6=o ai.
Price of anarchy of a network design game is the ratio of the costs of a worst Nash equilibrium
and of an optimum strategy profile. Price of stability is the ratio of the costs of a best Nash
equilibrium and of an optimum strategy profile. Potential optimum is a strategy profile p that
minimizes the potential function Φ =
∑
e
∑ne
i=1
ce
i . Potential-optimum price of anarchy/stability
is the ratio of the costs of the worst/best potential-optimum profile and of an optimum strategy
profile. Myopic sequential price of anarchy/stability is the worst-case/best-case ratio of the
costs of a strategy profile that can be obtained by ordering the players as in a permutation pi
and letting player pi(i) choose the best-response ppi(i) in the game induced by the first i players
pi(1), pi(2), . . . , pi(i) and of an optimum profile.
Note on related concepts. The term sequential price of anarchy has been used [18, 2]
to express a different, yet still closely related, concept compared to the notion of the myopic
sequential price of anarchy/stability. In the sequential price of anarchy, players also come one
by one, and decide their strategy upon arrival, but the stability of the outcome is measured in
terms of Nash equilibria again. In some sense, the game resembles extensive games. Observe
that profiles p that get compared to optima in the myopic sequential price of anarchy/stability
are in general no Nash equilibria.
3 Price of Anarchy/Stability for Multicast on Rings
It is known that the price of anarchy on general graphs is at most n, and that this bound is
tight. The tight example actually is a multicast game on a ring, and the general analysis of the
price of anarchy thus carries over to our multicast game on rings. For completeness, we show
the example in Fig. 2.
Theorem 3.1 ([3]). Price of anarchy for mutlicast games on rings is at most n. This is tight.
We now turn our attention to the price of stability. The example from Fig. 3, due to
Anshelevich et al. [3], shows that the price of stability can be as high as 4/3 (observe that
the game possesses a unique Nash equilibrium where both players use the direct edge to get
connected to t). We now show that the price of stability cannot get larger than that for multicast
games on rings, and therefore answer the open question asked by Fanelli et al. [12].
Theorem 3.2. Price of stability in the multicast game on rings is at most 43 .
In the proof of the theorem we will use the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3. If a strategy profile p in which an edge i is not used is not Nash equilibrium, then
either player i or player i− 1 can improve her cost by changing her strategy.
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Proof. Since the strategy profile p is not a Nash equilibrium, there exists a player k that can
change her strategy and improve the cost. Assume, without loss of generality, that k < i − 1.
Since edge i is not used in p, it follows that player k uses the left path to get to t. The cost of
k in p is thus
k∑
l=0
al
i− l , which is, by our assumption, bigger than the cost of k if she switches to
the right path, i.e., bigger than
i−1∑
l=k+1
al
i− l + 1 +
n∑
l=i
al
l − i+ 1. It follows that player i− 1 also
uses the left path in p, and thus her cost is at least the cost of player k, whereas the alternative
cost of i− 1 if she switches to the right path is at most the alternative cost of player k. Hence,
the alternative cost of player i− 1 is smaller than her cost in p, and player i− 1 thus improves
her cost as well.
of Theorem 3.2. Consider an optimum strategy profile and let o be the edge that is not used
in it. If optimum is also Nash equilibrium, then price of stability is 1 and the claim follows.
Otherwise, optimum is not a Nash equilibrium and, by Lemma 3.3, one of the endpoints of the
edge o can improve its cost. Assume, without loss of generality, that player o− 1 can improve.
We now consider the following best-response dynamics: let o − 1 improve; then, edge o − 1 is
not used, and in case we have not reached Nash equilibrium, let player o−2 improve (the player
o−2 must be able to improve by Lemma 3.3), and so on, until some player o−k cannot improve
anymore (this happens at the latest for player 0), and we reach a Nash equilibrium.
We will show that the social cost of a Nash equilibrium that is reached by this best response
dynamics is maximized for k = 1, i.e., for the strategy profile reached after one step of the
dynamics. We then show that the cost of such a profile is at most 4/3 times the cost of the
optimum, which proves the theorem.
Let us first show the second part. Assume therefore that player o − 1 switches to improve
her cost, and the resulting profile is an equilibrium. In particular, we have that player o−2 does
not want to switch. This can be expressed by the following two inequalities:
l=n∑
l=o
al
l − o+ 1 ≤
l=o−1∑
l=0
al
o− l , and
l=o−2∑
l=0
al
o− 1− l ≤
l=n∑
l=o−1
al
l − o+ 2. We further introduce a normalization of the
edge costs so that the edges in the optimum sum up to 1. Thus, we obtain the normalization
equation
n∑
i=0,i 6=o
ai = 1. Now, taking the first inequality with weight 5, the second with weight 1,
and the normalization equality with weight 6, we obtain that the cost of the Nash equilibrium
where edge o− 1 is not used has cost
i=n∑
i=0,i 6=o−1
ai at most
4
3 .
We can proceed in the same way for every other value of k = 2, 3, . . . for which the reached
Nash equilibrium does not use edge o − k. For every k, we get for each of the players o − k −
1, o−k, . . . , o−1 an inequality stating that the player did not want, respectively wanted to swap
her strategy. For all values of k = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, we provide in the appendix the coefficients
with which we need to take the inequalities and to obtain the upper bound of at most 4/3 on
the cost of the Nash equilibrium.
If the length of the best-response dynamics is 8 or more, it follows that we do not need
to add further inequalities, and the 7 inequalities obtained for the first 7 deviating players are
enough to show the upper bound of 4/3 on the cost of the reached Nash equilibrium.
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4 Potential-Optimum Price of Anarchy for Multicast on Rings
The potential-optimum price of anarchy/stability has been first studied, in the context of the
network design games, by Kawase and Makino [16]. Besides other results, they proved that for
multicast network design games, the two values collide. Therefore, in the following, we only
study the potential-optimum price of anarchy (POPaA for short), and we show that it is at
most two for rings, and provide an infinite family of examples with increasing POPoA, which
we conjecture converges to two, but leave the formal analysis as an open problem. We have
analyzed one such game from the family which shows that POPoA can be as large as 1.99992.
Theorem 4.1. POPoA is at most 2 in the multicast game on rings.
Proof. Consider an optimal strategy profile O and let o be the edge that is not used in it.
Consider a potential optimum strategy profile P and let p be the edge in it that is not used by
any player. Assume, without loss of generality, that p < o.
By the definition of P , we have, for any strategy profile Q, Φ(P ) ≤ Φ(Q), and in particular
Φ(P ) ≤ Φ(O), i.e.,
p−1∑
i=0
ai ·Hp−i +
n∑
i=p+1
ai ·Hi−p ≤
o−1∑
i=0
ai ·Ho−i +
n∑
i=o+1
ai ·Hi−o. (1)
We now concentrate on ao and show that ao is at most the cost of optimum, i.e., at most∑
i 6=o
ai. This then shows that any strategy profile (and, in particular, P ) has cost at most twice
the cost of optimum.
Isolate in the second sum of the left hand side (LHS for short) of Equation (1) the term
with ao and put the rest of the sum to the right hand side (RHS). This rest will dominate
the second sum on the RHS, and by neglecting the resulting negative number, we get that
p−1∑
i=0
ai · Hp−i + ao · Ho−p ≤
o−1∑
i=0
ai · Ho−i, or, equivalently, that ao ≤
∑o−1
i=0 ai·Ho−i−
∑p−1
i=0 ai·Hp−i
Ho−p .
Analyzing the influence of p on the RHS, one can show that the RHS is maximized for p = 1.
Thus, we obtain that ao ≤
∑o−1
i=0 ai·Ho−i−a0
Ho−1 . Then, since Ho − 1 ≤ Ho−1 we get that ao ≤∑o−1
i=0 ai ≤
∑
i 6=o ai, which proves the claim and thus the theorem.
We now provide a construction of a game which shows that POPoA is at least 1.99992.
We conjecture that the construction can be used to prove an asymptotic lower bound of 2 on
POPoA.
Consider non-zero numbers a0, . . . , a2·l that sum up to 1, and where l is constant, o = n,
p = l − 1 and where an is equal to Hn−aHn , for some constant a. Compare the potentials of
the strategy profiles which do not use edge i for i = 0, . . . , i = 2 · l to the potential of P (the
strategy profile minimizing Φ) that does not include the p-th edge. Note that after canceling
the coefficients on both sides, the coefficient in front of an is a sum of a constant number of
terms converging to 0 for n tending to infinity, so these terms can be neglected. The potential
of the strategy profiles which do not use edge i for n2 > i > 2 · l is increasing when i is increasing
and decreasing towards n. We solved the resulting system of linear equations and obtained a
lower bound for POPoA converging to 1.99992 for l = 1000 and n tending to infinity. Thus, we
have the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2. There are games that have POPoA 1.99992.
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Figure 4: Lower bound example for the sequential price of anarchy
We leave it as an open problem to analyze the convergence of the POPoA of the above
construction, and conjecture that it converges to two.
Conjecture 4.3. There are games that have POPoA arbitrarily close to 2.
5 Myopic Sequential Prices of Anarchy/Stability
In this section we study the myopic sequential price of anarchy and the myopic sequential price
of stability.
5.1 Sequential price of anarchy in multicast game on rings
Lemma 5.1. The myopic sequential price of anarchy is at most 2 in the multicast games on
rings.
Proof. Consider an optimal strategy profile and let o be the edge that is not used. Consider any
permutation (order) pi of the players. If any player pi(i), i < o, decides to take a path containing
edge o for the first time then it means that ao ≤
l=i∑
l=0
al which is bounded by the cost of optimum.
Therefore, the whole cost of the ring is bounded by 2 times the cost of optimum.
The presented upper bounds is tight, as shows the example in Fig. 4, where pi = {0, 1, 3, 2}
results in myopic sequential price of anarchy equal to 2.
5.2 Myopic sequential price of stability in multicast game
In the myopic sequential price of stability we consider the best permutation of players, with
respect to the resulting network cost. In [7] authors prove that when the social knowledge
network graph is directed acyclic then the price of anarchy is bounded by 4 (Theorem 8). If we
consider that in the social knowledge graph each incoming player knows all the previous players
then the result can be directly translated into our setting, but we give a different (simpler than
the proof of general result in [7]), proof for our setting:
Theorem 5.2. The myopic sequential price of stability in multicast games on arbitrary graphs
is at most 4.
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Proof. Since there is a common target vertex t, any optimum strategy profile forms a Steiner tree
T on terminals si, i = 0, . . . , n−1 and t. Consider a permutation of the vertices that corresponds
to a depth-first search of the tree T , and make it the identity permutation (0, 1, . . . n− 1). Let
the players enter the game in this order, and make the myopic best responses. Denote by Bi the
cost of the edges that player i uses alone in her strategy at the moment she enters the game, and
let Si be the overall cost of player i when she enters. Then the cost of the resulting network is
i=n−1∑
i=0
Bi. Since every player optimizes her cost when she enters the game, we have the following
chain of inequalities: Si ≤ dT (si, si−1) + Si−1 − 12Bi−1, for i = 1, . . . , n − 1, where dT (u, v) is
the distance between nodes u and v using only the edges of the tree T . Each player i has the
following alternative strategy: first travel to the source (vertex) si−1 using the edges of T , and
then follow the strategy of player i− 1. Note that in this alternative strategy, player i saves at
least half of the cost of the edges that player i − 1 takes alone when she enters the game. For
the first player, we have the following inequality S0 ≤ dT (s0, t), because when she enters the
game, one of the possible strategies is to take a direct path from s0 to t using only the edges
of T . By summing up all inequalities given above, we get that 12
i=n−2∑
i=0
Bi + Sn−1 ≤ 2 · cost(T ).
Note that Sn−1 ≥ 12Bn−1, which results into the upper bound of 4.
This upper bound is tight, as the example (Theorem 5) from [7] shows, ratio in the lower
bound example is arbitrarily close to 4.
Proposition 5.3. There is a multicast game with the myopic sequential price of anarchy arbi-
trarily close to 4.
5.3 Myopic sequential price of stability on rings
In this section we consider the myopic sequential price of stability of the multicast games on
rings. The example from Fig. 3 shows that it can be as high as 43 . We prove the following
upper bound.
Theorem 5.4. The myopic sequential price of stability in the multicast games on rings is at
most 2619 .
Proof. Assume that the optimum strategy profile does not include the edge of cost ao, and with-
out loss of generality
i=o−1∑
i=0
ai ≥
i=n∑
i=o+1
ai. Consider the permutation pi = {n−1, . . . , o, 0, 1, . . . , o−
1}. First n− o players clearly take the right path, by our assumption. Consider the remaining
players. If there is no player which, upon arrival, prefers the right path over the left path, then
only edges of an optimum strategy profile are included into the resulting network which means
that the myopic sequential price of stability is 1. If the very first player 0 prefers the right
path, then all other players necessarily prefer the right path as well, and the resulting network
consists of all edges except for that of weight a0. But then a0 is at least as large as ao, resulting
again the myopic sequential price of stability equal to 1. Suppose that there exists i such that
every player l ≤ i prefers to take the left path, and only the player (vertex) i+ 1 prefers to take
the right path. This implies the following inequalities:
k=i∑
k=0
ak
i− k + 1 ≤
k=n∑
k=i+1
ak, and (2)
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k=o∑
k=i+2
ak ≤
k=i+1∑
k=0
ak
i+ 2− k , (3)
where the first inequality (2) indicates that the i-th player prefers the left path, and the second
inequality (3) indicates that the i+ 1-th player prefers the right. Our goal is to investigate the
maximum possible cost c of the resulting network, where c = a0 + · · · + ai + ai+2 + · · · + an.
Take the first inequality (2) with weight 219 , the second inequality (3) with weight
24
19 , and the
normalization equation a0 + · · · + ao−1 + ao+1 + · · · + an = 1 with weight 2619 . We obtain that
the sum on the left hand side s satisfies c ≤ s ≤ 2619 , which gives that c ≤ 2619 ≈ 1.368.
The permutation from the proof of Theorem 5.4 cannot be used to provide a better bound,
as there exists an example of a game, where the permutation results in a network of cost 2619
times larger than the cost of optimum. The example consists of 3 players and edges have weights
6
19 ,
10
19 ,
3
19 and
10
19 in the counter-clockwise order. Players who come in the game according to
the permutation {0, 1, 2, 3} take all edges except for the 3-rd edge of weight 319 , resulting into a
network of cost 2619 , while the optimum network cost is 1. Note that if players come according
to the “opposite” permutation (n − 1, . . . , 0), then the resulting network has the same cost as
the optimum network. We have experimentally played with these two permutations, and for
all inputs we tried, one of the two permutations resulted in networks of cost no more than the
4/3 of the optimum cost. Actually, we have checked that there is no instance of at most 1000
players where the better of the two permutations fails in that respect.
Conjecture 5.5. The myopic sequential price of stability in the multicast game on rings is at
most 43 .
6 Conclusions
We have analyzed several solution concepts for the multicast network design games on rings,
and demonstrated that they differ in terms of quality. Some of the derived bounds are not
shown to be tight, and we leave it for future work to make them tight.
We have also initiated the study of the myopic sequential price of stability, and analyzed
it for the multicast network design game on a ring. It is certainly an interesting challenge to
provide better bounds on this concept for general (not multicast) network design games.
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A Weights for Inequalities from the Proof of Theorem 3.2
In this appendix we provide the multiplicative weights of the inequalities using a dual to a
linear program that was solved to upper bound the price of stability in the multicast game
on rings. The first inequality is the normalization inequality, therefore its weight is the upper
bound on the price of stability. The next k inequalities indicate that the first k ≤ 7 players left
of edge e prefer to deviate, i.e., prefer to choose the right path instead of the left path, and the
last inequality indicates that we have a Nash equilibrium, i.e., the last player considered in the
best-response dynamics prefers to stick with the left path than to switch to the right path. The
objective of the linear program is to minimize the sum of the edge costs without the edge that
is not used by the Nash equilibrium achieved via the best response dynamics. The coefficients
(weights) are as follows:
• k = 1 (0: 4/3; 1: 10/9; 2: 2/9)
• k = 2 (0: 22/17; 1: 252/323; 2: 202/323; 3: 90/323)
• k = 3 (0: 29/23; 1: 2976/4025; 2: 1206/4025; 3: 2256/4025; 4: 1224/4025)
• k = 4 (0: 1.243533565; 1: 0.722076586; 2: 446160/1659763; 3: 0.268809463; 4: 0.528169383;
5: 0.329251827)
• k = 5 (0: 1.229596836; 1: 0.711037768; 2: 0.257115234; 3: 0.201170436; 4: 0.199302216;
5: 0.50797093; 6: 0.348431623)
• k = 6 (0: 1.217310111; 1: 0.702648246; 2: 0.250967669; 3: 0.189905238; 4: 0.168566505;
5: 0.179311025; 6: 0.494134279; 7: 0.362553601)
• k = 7 (0: 1.206536915; 1: 0.69586637; 2: 0.247111078; 3: 0.184286036; 4: 0.157438535; 5:
0.148587957; 6: 0.165607593; 7: 0.484007846; 8: 0.373384452)
For k > 7, we take only the first 7 inequalities indicating that the first 7 players prefer to
take the right path than to stick to the left path. This is enough to prove an upper bound
of 1.33081 for the price of stability. In the following, we list the weights of the inequalities of
the dual to our linear program (index k : denotes the weight of the inequality to player k): (0:
1.330802428; 1: 0.750587484; 2: 0.246845878; 3: 0.168106752; 4: 0.12615003; 5: 0.096800836;
6: 0.072578056; 7: 0.048719834).
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